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Age-Dependent Employment Protection 
 
This paper examines the age-related design of firing taxes by extending the theory of job 
creation and job destruction to account for a finite working life-time. We first argue that the 
potential employment gains related to employment protection are high for older workers, but 
higher firing taxes for these workers increase job destruction rates for the younger 
generations. On the other hand, age-decreasing firing taxes can lead to lower job destruction 
rates at all ages. Furthermore, from a normative standpoint, because firings of older 
(younger) workers exert a negative (positive) externality on the matching process, we find 
that the first best age-dynamic of firing taxes and hiring subsidies is typically hump-shaped. 
Taking into account distortions related to unemployment benefits and bargaining power 
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 1 Introduction
Faced with low employment rates for older workers, most OECD countries
have experimented with speciﬁc older worker employment protection in the
form of taxes on ﬁring and subsidies on hiring (see OECD [2006]). Additional
penalties for ﬁrms that lay oﬀ older workers have been introduced, either in
the form of a tax or higher social security contributions (e.g. Austria, Fin-
land, France and Spain) or in the form of paying part or all of the costs
of outplacement services to help workers ﬁnd new jobs (e.g. Belgium and
Korea). Older workers are also protected to a greater extent than younger
workers by tenure-related provisions: workers with longer tenure (more likely
to be older workers) are often required to be given longer notice periods in
the case of dismissals and higher severance payments. In Sweden, the Last
In-First Out rule implies that older workers are more protected in the event
of lay-oﬀs than younger workers since they usually have longer tenure. At the
same time, various hiring and wage subsidy schemes encouraging employers
to hire and to retain older workers have been introduced. The hirings of
older workers lead to permanent reduction or exonerations in social security
contributions in Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway and Spain. Direct
subsidies to employers who hire older workers also exist in Denmark, Ger-
many, Japan and Sweden. Employment subsidy schemes for older workers
(in-work beneﬁts) are present in Austria, Germany, Japan, the United King-
dom and the United States. The main objective of these policies is to protect
older workers from unemployment because these workers suﬀer from lower
job ﬁnding rates. This paper aims at examining the positive and normative
implications of these policies which increase the employment protection with
the age of the workers.
The existence of higher taxes for ﬁring and higher subsidies for hiring
older workers in most developed countries calls indeed for a theory of age-
dependent employment protection. Since the seminal work of Mortensen and
Pissarides [1999], it is well-established that employment protection reduces
job destruction but also reduces job creation. Combining ﬁring taxes with
hiring subsidies is then thought of as corresponding to a consistent policy set
to boost the employment rate. This paper calls into question the higher em-
ployment protection for older workers by extending the theory of job creation
and job destruction over a ﬁnite working life-time. What are the predicted
eﬀects of this policy on the older workers? If older workers beneﬁt from the
higher protection put in place in most developed countries, what are the con-
sequences of this policy on younger workers? Can this policy be legitimized
by welfare arguments? Surprisingly enough, the theoretical foundations and
implications of the age-dependent employment protection have not been yet
2addressed. This contrasts with the extensive use of this policy in OECD
countries (OECD [2006]). From this point of view, our paper ﬁlls a gap.
Our analysis of employment protection includes both positive and nor-
mative issues which are successively addressed. Unlike the large literature
following MP, we consider a life cycle setting characterized by an exogenous
age at which workers exit the labor market. The only heterogeneity across
workers is the distance to retirement. We also assume that ﬁrms cannot
ex-ante age-direct their search, that is vacancies cannot be targeted at a spe-
ciﬁc age group. However, once the contact with a worker is made, according
to the observed productivity of the job-worker pair, the ﬁrm can make the
choice of not recruiting the worker, and this productivity threshold decision
obviously depends on the age of the worker. These assumptions allow us to
be consistent with existing legislation prohibiting age-discrimination such as
in the US and European countries, together with the observed discrimination
against older workers (Neumark [2001]).
The shorter distance to retirement is then the key point to understanding
the economics of older worker employment. We think that it is the only
intrinsic characteristic of the older workers common to all countries. We
then consider that this is a natural starting point, to which other potential
sources of heterogeneity across workers of diﬀerent ages could be added1.
Because the horizon of older workers is shorter, the life-cycle labor market
equilibrium shows that ﬁrms invest less in labor-hoarding activities at the
end of the life cycle. This explains that the separation rate increases with
the age of the worker and why there is concern to protect older workers.
We then propose a positive analysis of the older worker employment pro-
tection. We ﬁrst argue that the impact of a ﬁring tax is greater for older
workers than for younger ones. Indeed, at the end of the working cycle,
introducing a ﬁring tax increases the present ﬁring cost without any future
consequences on the job value as the worker will be retired in the following
periods. For younger workers, the present ﬁring cost increases, but the job
value also decreases, as the ﬁrm rationally expects the future cost of the ﬁring
tax. In some sense, retirement allows ﬁrms to avoid the ﬁring tax, leading
them to more labor hoarding of older workers.2 Ultimately, this tax can be
high enough so that it implies a decreasing age-dynamic of job destruction
1For instance, one could think that older workers have more job-speciﬁc skills and
therefore suﬀer more from losing their job. The amount of idiosyncratic uncertainty could
be weaker for older workers. The bargaining power of younger and older workers is not
necessarily the same.
2In an inﬁnite horizon economy such as MP, a ﬁring tax has no impact on job destruc-
tions if the interest rate is zero, whereas in our model it still has strong impact on a ﬁrm’s
decision to ﬁre older workers.
3rates, the opposite of the laisser-faire equilibrium. Secondly, we emphasize
the age-diﬀerentiated eﬀects of higher employment protection for older work-
ers. Even though higher employment protection for older workers decreases
the job destruction rate for this age group, it increases the ﬁrings of younger
ones.3 On the other hand, we show that an age-decreasing path would allow
to unambiguously decrease job destruction rates for all workers, because it
gives ﬁrms incentives to keep a worker by expecting lower ﬁring taxes in the
future, whatever the age of the worker. This shape of the ﬁring taxes allows
the policy maker to reach his main objective: to sustain the older worker
employment rate.
The second step of our analysis is related to normative considerations.
In the context of matching frictions and wage bargaining, it is now well-
established that the decentralized equilibrium is in general not optimal, ex-
cept when the Hosios [1990] condition holds.4 In our ﬁnite working cycle
setting, we consider that each ﬁrm is engaged in a non age-directed search.
In that context, the age distribution of the unemployed workers determines
the return on vacancies. We show that older worker job destructions then
exert a negative externality on the employment of the younger unemployed
workers which is not internalized by ﬁrms in the decentralized equilibrium.
This is why the Hosios condition is not enough to restore the social optimal-
ity of the labor market equilibrium: there are too many (not enough) older
(younger) worker job destructions even though the optimal proﬁle of job
destructions is typically increasing with age as in the equilibrium outcome.
This result provides welfare foundations for age-dependent employment
protection. In a ﬁrst best perspective, it is optimal to implement a hump-
shaped age-dynamics for the ﬁring taxes and hiring subsidies which is at odds
with the existing policies. We then further explore the optimal age-dependent
employment protection in the context of distortions related to bargaining
power and unemployment beneﬁts. We show that high unemployment bene-
ﬁts (or high worker bargaining power) can even require strictly age-decreasing
ﬁring taxes and hiring subsidies. This result reﬂects the fact that distortions
related to unemployment beneﬁts are higher for younger workers.
Overall, the existing higher employment protection for older workers
seems to be at odds with the policy recommendations which can be deduced
from a life-cycle version of the MP model. Age-decreasing employment pro-
3These results are consistent with the recent empirical evidence of Behagel, Crépon and
Sédillot [2008] which stresses perverse eﬀects related to the French experience of higher
employment protection for workers over the age of 50.
4This condition states that the elasticity of the matching friction with respect to va-
cancies should be equal to the worker’s bargaining power (Hosios [1990]). This eﬃciency
result could also be obtained in a competitive search equilibrium (Moen [1997]).
4tection until retirement could be more eﬃcient in terms of both employment
and welfare. This result seems counter-intuitive if the objective is to reduce
the job destructions of older workers, but it is the natural implication of
their shorter distance to retirement. Our paper then makes the case for a
tax policy determined by age. This statement echoes recent studies which
also recommend making taxation dependent on age. For instance, Kremer
[1999] advocates a lower income tax on younger workers. We also echo re-
cent studies which try to legitimize individual-diﬀerentiated taxation (see
for instance Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis [2007] for a gender-based
approach).
The next section presents the benchmark model and the age-dynamic
properties of the equilibrium. The third section addresses the impact of
age-dependent employment protection on employment. The fourth section
deals with the social eﬃciency of the equilibrium and presents the optimal
age-dependent employment protection both in a ﬁrst and second best envi-
ronment. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 A Finite-Horizon Economy with Endogenous
Job Creations and Job Destructions
The primary objective of this section is to show that extending the job cre-
ation - job destruction approach to take into account a ﬁnite life-time hori-
zon of workers gives rise to an increasing (decreasing) age-dynamic of job
destructions (creations). This provides some foundations for the observed
low employment rate of older workers which has led some OECD countries
to implement ﬁring taxes and hiring subsidies targeted at these workers.
We consider an economy with labor market frictions à la Mortensen -
Pissarides [1994] with endogenous job creation and job destruction decisions,
extended to take into account for a ﬁnite life time horizon for workers. That
is, instead of assuming inﬁnite-lived agents, our setting is characterized by a
deterministic age T at which workers exit the labor market. Workers only
diﬀer respectively in their age i, and so in their distance to retirement. The
model is in discrete time and at each period the older worker generation
retiring from the labor market is replaced by a younger worker generation of
the same size (normalized to unity) so that there is no labor force growth in
the economy. The economy is at steady-state, and we do not allow for any
aggregate uncertainty. We assume that each worker of the new generation
enters the labor market as unemployed.
We consider (un)employment policies: (i) a ﬁring cost Fi which refers
5both to the implicit costs in employment protection legislation and to the
experience-rated unemployment insurance taxes, (ii) a hiring subsidy Hi,
that is a lump sum paid to the employer when a worker of age i is hired, (iii)
unemployment beneﬁts z.
2.1 Shocks and workers ﬂows
Firms are small and each has one job. The destruction ﬂows derive from
idiosyncratic productivity shocks that hit the jobs at random. Once a shock
arrives, the ﬁrm has no choice but either to continue production or to destroy
the job. Then, for age i 2 (2;T ¡ 1), employed workers are faced with
layoﬀs when their job becomes unproﬁtable. At the beginning of each age5,
a job productivity ² is drawn in the general distribution G(²) with ² 2 [0;1].
The ﬁrms decide to close down any jobs whose productivity is below an
(endogenous) productivity threshold (productivity reservation) denoted Ri.
Job creation takes place when a ﬁrm and a worker meet. The ﬂow of
newly created jobs result from a matching function, M(v;u), the inputs of
which are vacancies v and unemployed workers u. M is increasing and con-
cave in both its arguments, and with constant returns-to-scale. We assume
that ﬁrms cannot ex-ante age-direct their search and that the matching func-
tion embodies all unemployed workers. The ﬂow of newly created jobs also
depends on productivity thresholds R0
i because it is assumed that productiv-
ity values ² are known after ﬁrm and worker have met. R0
i may diﬀer from
Ri since ﬁrms are not liable for the ﬁring cost at this stage.
Let µ = v=u denote the tightness of the labor market. It is then straight-
forward to deﬁne the probability for unemployed workers of age i to be em-
ployed at age i + 1, as jci ´ p(µ)[1 ¡ G(R0
i+1)] with p(µ) =
M(u;v)
u . Simi-
larly, we deﬁne the job destruction rate for an employed worker of age i as
jdi = G(Ri).
At the beginning of their age i, the realization of the productivity level
on each job is revealed. Workers hired when they were i ¡ 1 years old (at
the end of the period) are now productive. Workers whose productivity
is below the reservation productivity Ri (R0
i) are laid oﬀ (not hired, for
those previously unemployed). For any age i, the ﬂow from employment to
unemployment is then equal to G(Ri)(1 ¡ ui¡1). The other workers who
remain employed (1 ¡ G(Ri))(1 ¡ ui¡1) can renegotiate their wage. The
age-dynamic of unemployment is then given by:
ui+1 = ui
£




+ G(Ri+1)(1 ¡ ui) 8i 2 (1;T ¡ 1) (1)
5This assumption is made to allow for analytical results. The persistency of shocks is
left for a quantitative empirical investigation of the model’s performance.
6for a given initial condition u1 = 1. The overall level of unemployment is
u =
PT¡1
i=1 ui, so that the average unemployment rate is u=[T ¡ 1].
2.2 Hiring and ﬁring decisions
Any ﬁrm is free to open a job vacancy and engage in hiring. c denotes the
ﬂow cost of recruiting a worker and ¯ 2 [0;1] the discount factor. Let V be
the expected value of a vacant position and J0





















where the hiring subsidy Hi is received by the ﬁrm when the job becomes
productive. At this time, the age of the hired worker is perfectly observed.
Beyond the traditional matching externality, the heterogeneity across ages
in ﬁlled job values and in productivity thresholds implies the existence of
intergenerational externalities in the search process: the more older unem-
ployed workers there are, the less is the expected return on a vacancy.
The zero-proﬁt condition V = 0 allows us to determine the labor market




















We follow MP by considering that the wage structure that arises as a
Nash bargaining solution has two tiers.6 The ﬁrst tier wage reﬂects the fact
that the hiring subsidy is directly relevant to the decision to accept a match
and that the possibility of incurring ﬁring costs in the future aﬀects the value
the employer places on the match. In turn, the second tier wage applies when
ﬁring costs are directly relevant to a continuation decision. For a bargained
outsider wage w0
i(²), the expected value J0
i (²) of a ﬁlled job by a worker of
age i is deﬁned, for 8i 2 [1;T ¡ 1], by:
J
0





Ji+1(x)dG(x) + ¯G(Ri+1)(V ¡ Fi+1) (3)
6Recently, this wage setting rule has been somewhat disputed. Shimer [2005] argue
that, in the conventional matching model, the wage rate is close to being as cyclical as
productivity, so that the model does not have enough power to generate the observed
cyclical volatility of unemployment. Using microeconometric evidence, Pissarides [2008]
however shows that the cyclical volatility of wages in the canonical matching model is
about the same as the one estimated for new matches. Furthermore, the alternative
“insider wage” rule is discussed in Appendix B and it shows that our main results are
robust to the wage setting process.
7whereas for a bargained insider wage wi(²), the expected value Ji(²) of a ﬁlled
job by a worker of age i is deﬁned, for 8i 2 [1;T ¡ 1], by:
Ji(²) = ² ¡ wi(²) + ¯
Z 1
Ri+1
Ji+1(x)dG(x) + ¯G(Ri+1)(V ¡ Fi+1) (4)
Optimal decisions of the ﬁrm are then characterized by productivity thresh-
olds fRi;R0





i) = ¡Hi ; Ji(Ri) = ¡Fi
Adding the free entry condition, V = 0, it is straightforward to derive the
following equations:








i = Ri + Fi ¡ Hi + w(R
0
i) ¡ w(Ri) (6)
Equation (5) gives the lowest level of productivity (Ri) necessary to avoid
a separation (ﬁring decision) and the equation (6) determines the lowest
productivity level (R0
i) for a newly created job (hiring decision). The pro-
ductivity threshold governing the hiring decision must be at least equal to
the outsider wage (w(R0
i)) net of the hiring subsidies (Hi). But ﬁrm also
expects proﬁts (continuation value). This continuation value is the same
as for a job occupied by an insider. Because the labor hoarding has the
same value for a newly created job as for an existing one, the link be-
tween R0
i and Ri is static (see equation (6)). The higher the wage, the
higher the reservation productivity Ri (R0
i), and hence the higher (lower)
the job destruction (creation) ﬂows. On the other hand, the higher the op-
tion value of ﬁlled jobs, the weaker the job destructions and the greater
the job creations. Because the job value vanishes at the end of the work-
ing life, labor hoarding of older workers is less proﬁtable. It is worth de-
termining the terminal age conditions: RT¡1 = wT¡1(RT¡1) ¡ FT¡1 and
R0
T¡1 = RT¡1 + FT¡1 ¡ HT¡1 + w(R0
T¡1) ¡ w(RT¡1).
82.3 Nash bargaining
Values of insiders, outsiders (on a job of productivity ²) and unemployed
workers of any age i, 8i < T, are respectively given by7:
W
0
























i+1)Ui+1 + (1 ¡ p(µ))Ui+1
#
(9)
with b and z denoting the domestic production and the unemployment beneﬁt
respectively.
For a given bargaining power of the workers, °, considered as constant
across ages, the global surplus generated by a job is divided according to the
following two sharing rules which are the solution of the conventional Nash
bargaining problems in the context of two-tier contracts8:
W
0




i (²) + Hi + W
0
i (²) ¡ Ui
¤
(10)
Wi(²) ¡ Ui = ° [Ji(²) + Fi + Wi(²) ¡ Ui] (11)
so that the equations for the initial and subsequent wage bargaining are (see
Appendix A for details on derivation):
w
0
i(²) = ° (² + cµ¿i + Hi ¡ ¯Fi+1) + (1 ¡ °)(b + z) (12)
wi(²) = ° (² + cµ¿i + Fi ¡ ¯Fi+1) + (1 ¡ °)(b + z) (13)




























¿i gives the value of a worker hired at age i relative to the expected value of
a job according to the age distribution of unemployed workers. ¿i decreases
7We assume that WT = UT so that the social security provisions do not aﬀect the wage
bargaining and the labor market equilibrium.
8Again, see Appendix B for an examination of an alternative “insider wage” rule.
9To derive this expression, notice that J0
i+1
0(²) = 1 ¡ ° and J0
i (R0
i) = ¡Hi im-
plies that J0

















9with age10. Despite the assumption of an undirected search, implying a
homogenous search cost for each match, wages are age-speciﬁc.
Contrary to Mortensen and Pissarides’ framework, the equilibrium is no
longer symmetrical. Due to the ﬁnite-lived assumption, the way turn-over
costs interact with the wage bargaining process depends on the age of the
workers through the variable ¿i. This means that ending up with a young
worker is more worth while than hiring an older one for the ﬁrm. Hence,
younger workers capture a larger fraction of the search costs than the older
worker. A younger worker has then to be rewarded for more than the saving
of the average search costs (cµ).11
As in Mortensen and Pissarides [1999], the diﬀerence between the initial
wage and subsequent renegotiation arises because hiring subsidies are sunk
in the latter case but on-the-table in the former, and termination costs are
not incurred if no match is formed initially but must be paid if an existing
match is destroyed. From that point of view, the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes and
hiring subsidies on these wage rules are conventional:
(i) The hiring subsidy Hi increases the initial wage w0
i(²) because this gain
is conditional on agreement to form the match, whereas the discounted
ﬁring tax ¯Fi+1 decreases this wage because it reduces the expected
match surplus at the creation date. Workers then get a share ° of the
expected net subsidy of the job, Hi ¡ ¯Fi+1.
(ii) Once the job is created, the hiring subsidy no longer inﬂuence wages
in continuing jobs wi(²), but in turn the employer is now liable for
the ﬁring tax Fi and this strengthens the workers’s hand in the wage
bargaining. Accordingly, wages for continuing workers are increased
(decreased) by ﬁring costs if the ﬁrm expects that keeping the worker
accounts for an additional cost (gain), that is if Fi < ¯Fi+1 (Fi >
¯Fi+1).
10As shown hereafter, and at least in an economy without a labor market policy, ¿1 > 1
for the youngest workers, ¿T¡1 = 0 for the oldest ones, and ¿i+1 · ¿i 8i.
11For a given productivity level ², the wage is lower for a worker of age i + 1 than
for a worker of age i, wi+1(²) · wi(²). Age-decreasing dynamics of wages are obviously
at odds with empirical ﬁndings. This shortcoming could easily be overcome by allowing
the model to account for exogenous human capital accumulation. For instance, consider
hi+1 = (1+¹)hi, where the productivity of the job is now given by hi², it can be the case
that the growth rate ¹ ¸ 0 is high enough to imply wi+1(²) ¸ wi(²). Furthermore, even
though a higher growth rate would account for higher labor market tightness, the shape
of the age-dynamics of job creations and job destructions would be unaﬀected.
102.4 The labor market equilibrium
Proposition 1. A labor market equilibrium with wage bargaining exists and
it is characterized by:
c
q(µ)












b + z +
°
1 ¡ °
cµ¿i = Ri + ¯
Z 1
Ri+1
[1 ¡ G(x)]dx + Fi ¡ ¯Fi+1 (15)
R
0
i = Ri + Fi ¡ Hi (16)
ui+1 = ui
£



















¶, with terminal conditions RT¡1 = b +
zT¡1 ¡ FT¡1, R0
T¡1 = b + zT¡1 ¡ HT¡1 and a given initial condition u1.
Proof. Combining (2), (5), (6), (7) (13) and noticing that J0
i+1
0(²) = 1¡° and
J0
i (R0
i) = ¡Hi implies that J0
i (²) = (1¡°)(² ¡ R0
i)¡Hi, as well as J0
i+1(²) =
1 ¡ ° and Ji(Ri) = ¡Fi implies Ji(²) = (1 ¡ °)(² ¡ Ri) ¡ Fi. Furthermore,














Ri+1 (x ¡ Ri+1)dG(x) =
R 1
Ri+1[1 ¡ G(x)]dx.
In particular, equation (15) shows that a job is destroyed when the ex-
pected proﬁt from the marginal job -current product plus option value from
expected productivity shocks- (right side of (15)) fails to cover the worker’s
reservation wage (left side). Without any policy distortions, the reservation
productivity governing the hiring decision (R0
i) is equal to the reservation pro-
ductivity determining the ﬁring decision because insider and outsider wages
are equal and there are no termination and opening costs/gains. On the
other hand, it is obvious that the age-dynamics of job creations and job
destructions depend on the age design of employment protection.
2.5 The age-dynamics of job creations and job destruc-
tions in a laissez-faire economy
As a benchmark case, we ﬁrst consider the equilibrium age-dynamics of job
creations and job destructions without any labor market policies. This al-
lows us to show that older workers face a higher (lower) probability of exit
from employment (unemployment). Let us denote ~ Ri and ~ µ the productivity
thresholds and the labor market tightness respectively in the case of no labor
market policy (z = 0 and Hi = Fi = 0 8i).
11Proposition 2. The equilibrium without any labor policies is characterized
by ~ Ri+1 ¸ ~ Ri 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 1].
Proof. The age-dynamics of job creations and job destructions is governed
by the sequence f ~ Rig
T¡1
i=2 which solves:




with terminal conditions ~ RT¡1 = b, and where ~ µ is deﬁned by c








~ Ri+1[1 ¡ G(x)]dx
´
with ui+1 = ui
h
1 ¡ p(~ µ)(1 ¡ G( ~ Ri+1))
i
+
G( ~ Ri+1)(1 ¡ ui). Solving backward this equation (with ¯[1 ¡ °p(~ µ)] < 1)
and starting with terminal condition ~ RT¡1 = b, we obtain ~ Ri+1 ¸ ~ Ri.
Because the horizon of older workers is shorter, ﬁrms invest less in labor-
hoarding activities at the end of the life cycle, and older workers are more
vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. Otherwise stated, this reﬂects the fact
that labor-hoarding decreases with the worker’s age. It is then straightfor-
ward to see that this increasing (decreasing) age-dynamic of job destructions
(creations) is, at least qualitatively, able to account for the observed low
employment rate of older workers.12
3 The Impact of Firing Taxes Revisited
Faced with the low employment rate of older workers, most developed coun-
tries have experimented with higher employment protection combined with
subsidies targeted at these workers. The main objective of this section is to
question, from a positive point of view, the impact of such policies.
It is well-known following Mortensen and Pissarides [1999] that stricter
employment legislation protects workers who already have a job, but at the
expense of those without a job. The overall impact on employment is then
theoretically ambiguous unless hiring subsidies oﬀset the perverse eﬀects of
employment protection on job creation. It is straightforward to see that
such a result also holds in our framework because the ﬁring tax increases
productivity thresholds at the time of job creation, whatever the worker’s
age (condition (16)). But the incidence of ﬁring taxes on job creation and
job destruction is still age-dependent.
12Quantitative assessment of the model is beyond the scope of this paper (see Chéron,
Hairault and Langot [2008] for such an exercise).
123.1 On the age-diﬀerentiated eﬀect of ﬁring taxes
As a preliminary step, our objective is ﬁrst to examine the age-diﬀerentiated
eﬀect of a constant ﬁring tax (Fi = F 8i) on the age-dynamics of job ﬂows.
Without loss of generality, we consider also that Hi = F 8i so that a ﬁring tax
unambiguously increases employment rates at all ages. However, the impact
on the job destruction and job creation rates remains age-dependent. We
argue indeed that, in a ﬁnite horizon setting, there is a speciﬁc intertemporal
trade-oﬀ related to the introduction of a ﬁring tax.















Proof. Consider z = 0, Fi+1 = Fi ´ F and Hi = F so that R0
i = Ri in








Ri+1[1 ¡ G(x)]dx with
dRT¡1
dF = ¡1 from Proposition 1. Then, it
remains to iterate backward from i = T ¡ 1 to i = 2, having in mind that
¯ · 1, p0(µ) ¸ 0 and dµ
dF ¸ 0 (straightforward with Hi = F).
A given ﬁring tax is thus found to reduce the job destruction (creation)
rate of older workers more (less) than younger ones. Otherwise stated, the
potential employment gains related to F are greater for older workers.
To get further intuitions on this result, let us also assume ¯ ! 1. It is
straightforward to see that in an inﬁnite horizon economy à la MP, we would
no longer have the impact of the ﬁring tax F on job destruction13: the value
of avoiding punishment today is equal to the loss in job value induced by the
expected ﬁring taxes. In this extreme case, a constant ﬁring tax is neutral.





dF < 0 8i. At the end of the working cycle, introducing a
ﬁring tax increases the present ﬁring cost without any future consequences
on the job value as the worker will be retired in the next period. In other
words, the value of avoiding punishment today is not canceled out by the
expected future loss. Retirement allows ﬁrms to avoid the ﬁring tax, leading
them to more labor hoarding of older workers. This suggests that evaluat-
ing employment protection in an inﬁnite-lived agent context understates the
potential employment gains implied by this policy.
13To state this result, consider Ri = Ri+1 ´ R in (15). For ¯ ! 1 and ° ! 0, we then
have dR
dF = 0.
13We are even able to state that the impact of ﬁring costs can be sizeable
enough at the end of the life cycle to imply that older workers face a lower
probability of job destruction than younger ones.
Proposition 4. There exists ^ F > 0 such that if F ¸ ^ F, then RT¡1 · Ri+1 ·
Ri 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 1].
Proof. Let us consider Proposition 1 with z = 0, Hi = F 8i and Fi+1 = Fi ´
F, and let us deﬁne ª(y) ´ (1 ¡ °p(µ))
R 1
y [1 ¡ G(x))dx, so that ª0(y) < 0.
By deﬁnition Ri = b ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)F ¡ ª(Ri+1), so that Ri ¡ Ri+1 = ª(Ri+2) ¡
ª(Ri+1). Accordingly, RT¡2 ¸ RT¡1 is a suﬃcient condition to imply Ri ¸
Ri+1 8i. Then, RT¡2 ¸ RT¡1 () F ¸ (1¡°p(µ))
R 1
b¡F[1¡G(x)]dx which
implies that F ¸
R 1
b¡F[1¡G(x)]dx is a suﬃcient condition for RT¡2 ¸ RT¡1,
hence Ri ¸ Ri+1. Otherwise stated, from 0 · G(x) · 1, there exists a unique
^ F solving ^ F =
R 1
b¡ ^ F[1¡G(x)]dx, such that F ¸ ^ F implies Ri ¸ Ri+1 8i.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Without any policy
instruments, older workers face a higher (lower) rate of job destructions (cre-
ations) because of their shorter horizon. In turn, the introduction of a ﬁring
tax has a greater impact on the probability of job destruction for older work-
ers than for younger ones. Hence, allowing for suﬃciently high ﬁring taxes
can reverse the age-dynamics of job destructions and job creations. More
precisely, this is unambiguously the case, whenever the value of the labor
hoarding for a worker of age T ¡2 is less than the ﬁring cost F. Then, since
the job destruction rate for a worker of age T ¡ 2 turns out to be higher
than that of a worker of age T ¡ 1, this is the overall age-dynamic of job
destructions which is reversed in the context of a constant ﬁring tax14.
To conclude, at this stage Properties 3 and 4 emphasize that the laying
oﬀ of older workers is, in relative terms with respect to younger workers, very
sensitive to the ﬁring tax. Employment protection has an age-diﬀerentiated
impact. It may make age-dependent employment protection unnecessary if
the only objective is to stimulate more the employment of older workers.
3.2 The impact of age-increasing ﬁring taxes
It is obvious that not only the level of ﬁring taxes, but also their shape
depending on age play a key role in the age-dynamic of job ﬂows. A quick
look at Proposition 1 shows that Fi tends to push down Ri by increasing
the current cost of ﬁring, while Fi+1 increases Ri by reducing the value of
14Indeed, job destruction at age T ¡ 3 becomes higher than at age T ¡ 2 because
RT¡2 ¸ RT¡1, and so on.
14labor-hoarding. This suggests that the shape of the discounted ﬁring costs
is crucial for the separation decisions.
Proposition 5. If Fi+1 = (1+¢F)Fi 8i 2 [2;T ¡2], with ¢F ? 0, and Hi =





² If ¢F < 1
¯ ¡ 1, then
@Ri
@Fi · 0 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 1]
² If ¢F > 1
¯ ¡ 1, then there exists a threshold age ~ i such that
@Ri
@Fi ¸
0 8i 2 [2;~ i] and
@Ri
@Fi · 0 8i 2 [~ i;T ¡ 1]
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Proposition 5 ﬁrst stresses that introducing a ﬁring tax unambiguously
decreases ﬁrings of the oldest workers. This is because, by deﬁnition, retire-
ment avoids this tax: this gives ﬁrms incentives to wait for one period instead
of ﬁring the worker at age T ¡ 1 and being liable for the ﬁring cost FT¡1.
For all the other workers, the impact of ﬁring taxes on job destruction rates
depends on the age-dynamics of taxes. If ﬁring taxes decrease with age or
do not rise too fast (¢F < 1
¯ ¡1), they decrease job destruction rates for all
ages. It is in ﬁrms’ interest to reduce ﬁrings because the value of avoiding
punishment is higher than the expected loss induced by future taxes. Ulti-
mately, ﬁrms avoid these costs by waiting for workers’ retirement. In some
sense, it generalizes to all ages the idea that labor hoarding allows ﬁrms to
avoid (at least partially) ﬁring costs.
On the other hand, the growth rate of ﬁring taxes with age can be so
high that it increases job destruction rates for younger workers: the value
of avoiding punishment today is lower than the expected increase in future
taxes, leading ﬁrm to ﬁre early. For older workers, the proximity to retirement
compensates for the impact of the expected growth in the ﬁring tax.
Overall, Proposition 5 highlights that age-increasing ﬁring taxes have
some perverse eﬀects by increasing the job destruction rates for younger
workers. It is worth emphasizing that these results can give theoretical sup-
port to the empirical ﬁndings of Behaghel, Crépon and Sédillot [2008] who
use microeconometric estimates to assess the French experiment (since 1987)
with a higher ﬁring tax for workers of 55 years old or more. The estimates
mainly show that ﬁrings of people under 55 have increased.
15A similar statement can be derived when assuming Hi = 0 8i, ° ! 0 and 8FT¡1 > 0
(available upon request).
154 Optimal age-dependent employment protec-
tion
At this stage, we have mainly argued that the potential employment gain
for older workers of higher ﬁring taxes and hiring subsidies targeted at them
could be largely due to the short distance to retirement. However, such a
policy may have some perverse eﬀects on younger generations. On the other
hand, age-decreasing ﬁring taxes lead to decreased job destructions for all
workers.
It is so important to go beyond this positive approach by proposing a wel-
fare analysis of age-dependent employment protection. Is an age-increasing
dynamic consistent with optimal age-dependent employment protection?
4.1 An intergenerational externality
Traditionally, the equilibrium unemployment framework is known to gener-
ate congestion eﬀects which take the decentralized equilibrium away from
the eﬃcient allocation. However, when the elasticity relative to vacancies
in the matching function is equal to the bargaining power of ﬁrms (Hosios
condition), social optimality can be reached. As demonstrated hereafter,
this result no longer holds here, because there is a speciﬁc intergenerational
externality.
We derive the optimal allocation by maximizing the steady-state output
with respect to labor market tightness µ? and reservation productivity for
each age, R?





































Proposition 6. Let ´ = 1 ¡
µ?p0(µ?)
p(µ?) , the maximum value of steady-state
16output is reached when:
c
q(µ?)



























i ¡ 1) 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 2] (21)
R
?


















Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Equation (20) is similar to equation (14) obtained in the decentralized
equilibrium, on condition that the worker share of employment surplus (°)
is now replaced by the elasticity relative to unemployment in the matching
function (´(µ?)). Equation (21) shows the optimal allocation of the age
i labor force: the expected proﬁt from the marginal employed worker (the
current product plus the option value for expected productivity shocks) must
be equal to the social return of the search activity which corresponds to
the allocation as an unemployed worker. At the equilibrium, the return
on unemployment is simply given by the reservation wage. For the social
planner, the return on an additional age i unemployed worker is reduced by
the cost of each vacancy per age i unemployed worker, which is equal to cµ?.
The social value of the search activity is not symmetrical: because a young
(old) worker increases (decreases) the average search value in the economy,
the social value of the young unemployed worker is larger than that of the
old unemployed worker. At the end of the life-cycle (i = T ¡ 1), the social
return on a worker occupied in the search process is at its lowest value: the
oldest workers can be contacted by a ﬁrm whereas the surplus associated
with this match is nil. Indeed, the relative surplus of an age T ¡ 1 worker
(the oldest workers) to the average of the employment surplus is equal to
zero (¿?
T¡1 = 0): the return of the search is zero (
´
1¡´cµ?¿?
T¡1 = 0) and the
size of the intergenerational externality takes its maximum value cµ?. Then,
the social value of unemployment for workers of age T ¡ 1 turns out to be
b ¡ cµ? (equation (22)).








17Proof. First note that R?



















If b > cµ?, the proof is straightforward by solving this equation backward, and









is not age-dependent. If the condition b > cµ? does not hold, then R?
T¡1




Proposition 7 ﬁrst emphasizes that higher (lower) job destruction (cre-
ation) rates for older workers are typically an eﬃcient age-pattern of labor
market ﬂows, as in the decentralized equilibrium. Because of their shorter
horizon, older workers must be ﬁred more and hired less. Despite the fact
that the shape is qualitatively the same, this does not mean that the equilib-
rium job destruction and job creation rates are consistent with their eﬃcient
counterparts.
Importantly, when the job destruction rate is strictly positive, the diﬀer-
ence between the private and the social value of unemployment emphasizes
the existence of ineﬃciencies. Unlike the ﬁrms, the planner takes into ac-
count the impact of a particular unemployed worker of age i on the search
process. Compared to Pissarides [2000], our life-cycle framework introduces
another externality, namely an intergenerational externality. Firms neither
take into account the facts that ﬁrings of older workers reduce the average
value of a vacancy nor that ﬁrings of younger workers increase this average
value.
Proposition 8. The Hosios condition, ´ = °, does not achieve eﬃciency.
Proof. Straightforward by comparing the expression of R?
i in Proposition 6
and Ri in Proposition 1 and considering ° = ´.
This proposition states clearly that the Hosios condition ° = ´ allows the
private agents to internalize traditional search externalities in the decentral-
ized equilibrium, but not the intergenerational externalities in the matching
process. This last result suggest that age-speciﬁc labor market policies are
needed to improve the outcome of the decentralized equilibrium. This could
16This result is straightforward by noticing that the eﬃcient productivity threshold can
be restated as R?




18give some theoretical foundation to the age-speciﬁc ﬁring taxes and hiring
subsidies in place in a large set of OECD countries17.
4.2 The optimal age-dynamics of ﬁring costs and hiring
subsidies
Labor market policies designed by age may allow ﬁrms and workers to inter-
nalize the intergenerational externality. To focus on the impact of intergen-
erational externalities on the age design of labor market policies, we assume
throughout this section that ´ = °.
Proposition 9. Assuming ¯ ! 1, z = 0 and ´ = °, an optimal age-sequence










? (1 ¡ ¿
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i=2 and µ? are deﬁned in Proposition 6.
Proof. Straightforward by comparing Propositions 1 and 6 when assuming
´ = ° and z = 0.
Proposition 10. There exists an age ~ i deﬁned by ¿~ i = 1 such that F ?
i+1 ¸
F ?
i 8i · ~ i and F ?
i+1 · F ?
i 8i ¸ ~ i.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 9 by recalling that ¿?
1 > 1 and
¿?
T¡1 = 0.
Firings of the workers aged more than ~ i account for a negative externality
by increasing the average search cost. Otherwise stated, there are too many
ﬁrings of that type of worker in equilibrium. So, it is optimal to implement an
age-decreasing path of ﬁring taxes for older workers: as emphasized earlier,
the expectation of lower taxes in the future gives the right incentives for
ﬁrms to keep workers (to postpone job destruction). On the other hand,
for workers at age i · ~ i, who reduce the average search cost in the case of
ﬁrings, an age-increasing dynamic of ﬁring taxes turns out to be the optimal
age-dependent employment protection.
The ﬁrst best age-dynamic of ﬁring taxes and hiring subsidies is typically
hump-shaped over all the life cycle. The optimal age-design employment
protection would require implementing an age-decreasing ﬁring tax for the
older workers.
17Let us note that these policies would become pointless if an equilibrium with directed
search were sustainable.
194.3 Second best analysis
Turning to a second best perspective, we examine how the optimal age-
dynamic of ﬁring taxes and hiring subsidies is aﬀected by the introduction
of unemployment beneﬁts and the reconsideration of the Hosios condition.
Proposition 11. Assuming ¯ ! 1, z > 0 and ´ = °, an optimal age-










? (1 ¡ ¿
?
i ) + z 8i 2 [2;T ¡ 2] and F
?










i=2 and µ? are deﬁned in Proposition 6.
Proof. Straightforward by comparing Propositions 1 and 6 when assuming
´ = ° and z > 0.
It is straightforward to see that the existence of unemployment beneﬁts
accounts for a lower threshold age ^ i < ~ i above which the ﬁring tax is de-
creasing with age. Indeed, since unemployment beneﬁts implicitly generate
a constant tax on labor according to the ﬂow z, this increases wages and pro-
ductivity thresholds, and therefore requires the taxation of ﬁrings and the
subsidization of hirings. This tax would also incorporate the distortion eﬀects
of expected taxes in the future. In a symmetrical equilibrium (if ¿i = 1 8i),
this would imply that F ?
T¡1 = z and F ?
i =
PT¡1
j=i ¯T¡j¡1z. In other words,
in order to avoid ineﬃcient ﬁrings, the punishment costs associated with a
layoﬀ should be equal to the discounted sum of unemployment beneﬁts. This
gives an additional foundation for age-decreasing ﬁring taxes.
Taking into account intergenerational externalities (¿i 6= 1), the higher the
unemployment beneﬁts, the sooner the age-decreasing path of ﬁring taxes
and hiring subsidies. Accordingly, jobs destructions turns out to be too
high for some workers below ~ i, despite the ﬁrings of these workers account
for positive externalities. Hence, to reduce latter’s ﬁrings, it is required to
introduce age-decreasing employment protection from a critical age ^ i below
age ~ i. Ultimately, z could be large enough to imply a monotonously age-
decreasing dynamics of optimal ﬁring taxes and hiring subsidies.
Proposition 12. Assuming ¯ ! 1, z = 0 and ´ < °, an optimal age-
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i=2 and µ? are deﬁned in Proposition 6.
20High worker bargaining power also leads to increased wages and pro-
ductivity thresholds so that it also makes it desirable to implement an age-
decreasing ﬁring tax. However, in contradiction with the constant distor-
tion z related to unemployment beneﬁts, the distortion induced by the high
worker’s bargaining power (° > ´) now depends on the age of the worker.
This distortion decreases with the worker’s age because ¿i decreases with i.
This is because of the wage bargaining process, which generates lower dis-
tortions in the allocation of older workers. Indeed, the older workers have a
relative low labor market value and then capture a lower fraction of the search
costs than the younger workers. This compensates for the high bargaining
power of the workers at the end of the life-cycle. This lower distortion at the
end of the life-cycle gives further foundation to the implementation of lower
ﬁring taxes for older workers.
Proposition 12 shows the optimal age-design of ﬁring taxes in that con-
text. Ultimately, F ?
T¡1 = cµ?, since the value of a worker of age T ¡ 1 in
the future turns out to be zero, so that the optimal tax collapses to the ﬁrst
best policy. On the other hand, unemployment beneﬁts increase the ﬁring
tax even in this last stage of the life cycle (F ?
T¡1 = z+cµ? in Proposition 11).
Overall, this second-best analysis highlights the robustness of our results,
which call into question the current OECD practice of higher employment
protection for older workers.
5 Conclusion
Generally, our theory of age-dependent employment protection implies of im-
plementing age-decreasing ﬁring taxes for the older workers. This is at odds
with the current practise in most OECD countries, which have implemented
an age-increasing employment protection. This discrepancy between theory
and practise is even greater in a second-best perspective when the distortions
created by the existence of unemployment beneﬁts are taken into account.
This last point is not anecdotal as the European countries which have imple-
mented the highest employment protection for older workers also provide the
most generous unemployment beneﬁts. We then conclude that the existing
policies present strong perverse eﬀects, both in terms of overall employment
and of social welfare. It is important to note that this reconsideration is not
due to a conﬂict in terms of objectives: our framework is consistent with the
idea that older workers’ jobs must be protected. But reaching this objective
implies adopting age-decreasing ﬁring taxes for older workers’ jobs. Finally,
we show that at least it would be more eﬃcient to return to age-constant
employment protection, which has the advantage of better preserving older
21workers’ jobs without distorting the job creations and destructions of younger
workers.
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22A Wage equations under a two-tier structure
The sharing rules can be written as:











¡°Fi ¡ (1 ¡ °)Ui = ° [Ji(²) + Wi(²)] ¡ Wi(²) (24)
From value functions, it turns out that:








¡(1 ¡ °)¯G(Ri+1)Ui+1 ¡ °¯G(Ri+1)Fi+1
= °² ¡ wi(²) ¡ (1 ¡ °)¯Ui+1 ¡ °¯Fi+1 (25)
Combining this with (24) yields:












i (²) = °² ¡ w
0
i(²) ¡ (1 ¡ °)¯Ui+1 ¡ °¯Fi+1(27)
implies by combining with (23):
w
0
i(²) = ° (² + Hi ¡ ¯Fi+1) + (1 ¡ °)(Ui ¡ ¯Ui+1)
Then, let us notice that the unemployed value solves in equilibrium:


















































































G(x)]dx by integrating by parts. Substituting for Ui ¡ ¯Ui+1 from this ex-
pression into wi(²) and w0
i(²) one gets (13) and (12).
B Insider wage equilibrium
Outsiders, once hired, have an ex-post incentive to renege on the two-tier
structure by demanding the insider wage. A two-tier wage structure might
not be feasible. At least, if Fi ¸ Hi, from (12) and (13), it appears that
w0
i(²) > wi(²). In this section, as for instance Pissarides [2008], we look at
the implications of a pure insider wage equilibrium, that is when the second
tier wage sharing rule applies initially as well as to subsequent renegotiations.
Otherwise stated, we now consider that w0
i(²) = wi(²) (hence R0
i = Ri),
and the only relevant sharing rule is:
Wi(²) ¡ Ui = ° [Ji(²) + Fi + Wi(²) ¡ Ui]
In such circumstances, the unemployed value now solves:





(Wi+1(x) ¡ Ui+1)dG(x) + Ui+1
¸







(Ji+1(x) + Fi+1)dG(x) + Ui+1
¸


















cµ¿i + ¯Ui+1 + ¯p(µ)
°
1 ¡ °
[1 ¡ G(Ri+1)](Fi+1 ¡ Hi+1)
Substituting for Ui ¡ ¯Ui+1 from this expression into wi(²), one gets:
wi(²) = ° [² + cµ¿i + Fi ¡ ¯Fi+1 + ¯p(µ)[1 ¡ G(Ri+1)](Fi+1 ¡ Hi+1)]+(1¡°)(b + z)
So, the productivity threshold turns out to be deﬁned by:
b + zi +
°
1 ¡ °




[1 ¡ G(x)]dx + Fi ¡ ¯Fi+1





i+1 = z + cµ
? (1 ¡ ¿
?














It is thus obvious that if hiring subsidies only aim at countering the negative
impact of ﬁring costs on recruitment policy (H?
i = F ?
i ), the age design of
ﬁring taxes is unaﬀected by the wage bargaining process, either the two-tier
wage structure or the insider wage assumption. This is true for ° = ´, which





i=1 solves proposition 9.
In other words, in the particular case where the labor market policy aims
at internalizing intergenerational ineﬃciencies, since the optimal policy solves
H?
i = F ?
i , the optimal two-tier wage structure collapses to the insider wage
solution, i.e. w0
i(²) = wi(²).
C Proofs of propositions
C.1 The impact of ¢F on Ri
Let us consider Hi = Fi, which implies R0
i = Ri, and




Accordingly, it appears that
dRi = ¯(1 ¡ °p(µ))[1 ¡ G(Ri+1)]dRi+1 ¡ [1 ¡ ¯(1 + ¢F)]dFi 8i · T ¡ 2
Reasoning backward, starting with dRT¡1 = ¡dFT¡1, it is straightforward
to see that ¢F < 1
¯ ¡1 leads to 1¡¯(1+¢F) > 0 hence
@Ri
@Fi · 0 8i · T ¡2.
In turn, for ¢F > 1
¯ ¡ 1, 1 ¡ ¯(1 + ¢F) < 0, let us note that
dRT¡2 = ¡¯(1 ¡ °p(µ))[1 ¡ G(RT¡1)]dFT¡1 + [¯(1 + ¢F) ¡ 1]dFT¡2
dRT¡3 = ¯(1 ¡ °p(µ))[1 ¡ G(RT¡2)]f¡¯(1 ¡ °p(µ))[1 ¡ G(RT¡1)]dFT¡1 +
[¯(1 + ¢F) ¡ 1]dFT¡2g + [¯(1 + ¢F) ¡ 1]dFT¡3
:::
Hence, since ¯(1 ¡ °p(µ))[1 ¡ G(Ri)] < 1 8i, there exists a threshold age ~ i
such that
@Ri
@Fi > 0 8i · ~ i.
25C.2 The eﬃcient allocation
Let us denote ¸i and ¹i the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraints



















xdG(x) ¡ ¸i[1 ¡ G(Ri+1)]
¶
















Substituting for ¹i = 1, hence ¸i = Ri+1, the remainder of the proof is
straightforward with the deﬁnition p0(µ) = [1 ¡ ´(µ)]q(µ).
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